Investment-based asset pricing has highlighted the role of irreversibility as a determinant of firms' equity risk and expected return. In a neoclassical model of a firm with costly scale adjustment options, we show that the effect of flexibility (contraction and expansion options) is to determine the relation between risk and operating leverage: risk increases with operating leverage for inflexible firms, but decreases for flexible firms. Guided by theory, we construct easily reproducible proxies for inflexibility and operating leverage. Empirical tests provide support for the predicted interaction of these characteristics in stock returns and risk.
Introduction
Do more valuable real options make stock returns safer and thereby lower expected returns? Intuition suggests that the risk a firm's owners bear should decrease with its flexibility to respond to changes in operating conditions. Likewise, intuition suggests that risk should increase as a firm's fixed costs rise relative to sales, due to operating leverage. In a neoclassical model of a firm with both scale flexibility and operating leverage, we show that neither intuition is strictly correct. Instead, we show that firm risk is driven by an interaction of these two characteristics.
Empirical tests support the model's implications.
This study is among the first to explore the effect of cross-firm differences in operational flexibility for the risk and expected return characteristics of a firm's equity. 1 While the real options literature has long recognized that differences in option exercise costs imply important differences in investment policies (see, e.g., and ), the implications of this heterogeneity has received little attention in the asset pricing research.
Moreover, empirical research on corporate investment documents substantial differences across firms in the purchase and resale prices of physical capital. 2 These differences imply variation in the value of operating options to increase or decrease firm scale.
We utilize a dynamic model of a firm with assets-in-place (which entail fixed operating costs), contraction options (to scale back the firm's asset base in bad times), and expansion options (to scale up the firm's asset base in good times). The model is both rich enough to encompass ex ante heterogeneous firms, and yet simple enough to reveal general implications of this heterogeneity for equity returns. The key state variable is the firm's asset base scaled by its instantaneous productivity. As productivity varies exogenously, the state variable evolves continuously until the firm chooses to discretely increase or decrease its assets. Each firm will 1 The investment-based asset pricing literature has typically focused on the properties of collections of ex ante identical firms that differ only in their history of idiosyncratic shocks. See Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) , Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) , Zhang (2005) , Cooper (2006) , Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009) .
2 See, e.g., MacKay (2003) , Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) , Chirinko and Schaller (2009) , or Kim and Kung (2016) . optimally choose an upper and a lower boundary at which these scale adjustments are made.
When adjustment is more costly, the firm will wait longer before acting. Thus, an implication of the model is that inflexibility can be summarized by the range of scaled productivity.
In the model, real options may increase or decrease risk. Adjusting the firm's scale means exchanging (riskless) cash for (risky) assets. Exercising the option to contract (akin to a put option) thus attenuates firm risk, while exercising the option to expand has the opposite effect.
Prior to exercise, firm risk will reflect the likelihood of these scale adjustments. So, comparing two firms, if one has lower contraction costs than the other, it is more likely to exercise its put option, making it less risky. However, by the same logic, a firm with lower expansion costs is more risky. In both cases, lower adjustment costs make the firm more flexible. Hence, perhaps contrary to intuition, flexibility is not unambiguously associated with lower risk.
While the level of the risk premium is not, in general, increasing in inflexibility, the sensitivity of the risk premium to changes in scaled productivity (the state variable) is. This is the primary implication that we will test. If the firm had no real options, productivity declines would always raise systematic risk because of increased operating leverage caused by fixed costs.
But both expansion and contraction options work the opposite way: decreasing firm risk as productivity declines, despite the increase in operating leverage. Thus, the implication is equivalent to saying that the degree of flexibility drives the sign of the relation between operating leverage and expected return. We find this real option effect can be economically large: using plausibly calibrated parameters, simulated panels of firms that differ in scale adjustment costs indeed reveal both positive and negative relations between operating leverage and expected stock returns.
Turning to the data, we construct and validate a firm-level proxy for inflexibility that is guided by the theory and is easy to implement. As discussed above, the model implies that a firm's inflexibility is directly linked to the inaction region, i.e., the range of profitability that it experiences. We therefore measure a firm's inflexibility as the historical range (maximum minus minimum) of its operating costs-to-sales ratio, scaled by the volatility of the firm's sales growth. 3 In general, this range will be affected by many dimensions of flexibility, such as the ability to alter or transform factor intensity, product mix, pricing strategy, and technology.
While these dimensions are omitted from the model, they have in common the implication that less flexible firms will exhibit a wider range. 4 We also note that the notion of "scale" in the model is not confined to physical capital. The input to the firm's production function can be viewed as a bundle of capital, labor, knowledge, etc, all of which are costly to adjust and may contribute fixed costs to production. Our validation tests show that the range measure is positively related to an array of other proxies for factor adjustment frictions proposed in the empirical literature. Next, the model implies that operating leverage is not a fixed firm characteristic, but one that varies with the ratio of quasi-fixed costs (i.e., those that do not scale with output) to sales.
We therefore assess a firm's operating leverage each quarter using regression-based estimates of quasi-fixed costs. We verify that our measurement strategies for both quantities are theoretically sound and feasible in the sense that applying them within simulated panels of firms yields numbers that are strongly correlated with the population values they are designed to estimate.
With these measures, we test the model's primary implication in the data. Portfolios formed via two-way independent sorts on inflexibility and operating leverage indeed reveal the predicted return pattern, namely, operating leverage increases expected returns more for more inflexible firms. Our baseline results show that the monthly excess returns for the high-minus-low operating leverage portfolio for most flexible and least flexible firms are 12 and 88 basis points, respectively. The difference between these two numbers is significant both statistically and economically. In Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions using firm-level returns, these findings are robust to the inclusion of standard controls and to alternative measurement of operating 3 Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) use a similar range measure to test a dynamic capital structure model. 4 Our work is related to the literature on nominal rigidities, which are one aspect of adjustment inflexibility. Recent contributions studying implications of price and wage rigidities for asset pricing are Uhlig (2007) , Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) , Favilukis and Lin (2015) , Li and Palomino (2014) , Weber (2015) , and Gorodnichenko and Weber (2015) . leverage. Specifically, the model predicts a positive interaction effect of operating leverage with inflexibility. When both variables are expressed in percentile rank, the estimated interaction effect is more than 100 basis points per month. Additional robustness tests using industry-based measures of flexibility and firm loadings on an inflexibility factor, provide further support for the main findings.
Finally, we also examine the model's predictions for the second moments of equity returns.
Holding fundamental risk constant, theory implies that systematic and total risk should exhibit the same behavior as expected returns. Indeed, the patterns of portfolio return volatility and average portfolio beta across portfolios sorted by inflexibility and operating leverage resemble the ones from the return test. Specifically, these double sorts show that the relation between portfolio return volatility (or average portfolio beta) and operating leverage becomes increasingly positive as inflexibility increases.
Model
To study the expected return and risk implications of ex ante differences in operating flexibility, we employ the model developed in Hackbarth and Johnson (2015) (hereafter HJ). The model describes the evolution of a firm's optimal investment and disinvestment policy in response to permanent productivity shocks, in a continuous-time, partial-equilibrium economy. The model embeds a natural notion of firm flexibility, and is tractable enough to enable ready exploration of the role of heterogeneous firm characteristics in determining expected return patterns in the cross-section. 5 After briefly reviewing the model and describing our interpretation of flexibility, we assess the model's implications for the joint relation between flexibility, operating leverage, and expected return or risk. We illustrate the magnitudes of the implied effects in plausibly calibrated panel simulations. 5 HJ fully characterize the firm's risk premium as a function of the single state-variable, scaled productivity. The model solution does not, however, provide an analytical mapping between fixed firm characteristics and the risk premium.
Framework
HJ consider a firm with repeated expansion and contraction options that allow it to alter its scale (and operating expenses) in response to productivity shocks, subject to adjustment costs.
That work follows the production-based asset pricing literature by viewing the firm's scale as equivalent to its physical capital. The economic logic of the HJ model is not confined to plant and equipment, however. Here we suggest a broader interpretation, and think of the firm's scale as encompassing the composite of productive factors that the firm has in place. Just as accounting rules view long-term leases as capitalized assets, so one could view long-term contracts for other inputs (human capital, labor, raw materials and other supplies, franchise agreements) as being assets-in-place in three senses: (1) they are needed to generate output; (2) their cost contains a fixed component that does not scale with output; and (3) their quantity is costly to adjust. Other assets, such as knowledge, organizational capital, and intellectual property, may share these properties.
With this interpretation in mind, we let A denote the composite scale of the firm, or the total assets-in-place, and write the firm's profit flow per unit time (i.e., net sales minus quasi-fixed operating costs) as:
where γ ∈ (0, 1) captures returns to scale and m > 0 denotes the operating cost per unit of A.
Unless adjusted by the firm, A follows dA/dt = − δ A, where δ ≥ 0 captures the generalized depreciation, or retirement rate of the asset base.
The productivity process θ evolves as a jump-diffusion with drift µ, volatility σ, and obsolescence rate η. The stochastic differential equation is as follows:
where W is a standard Wiener process and N is a Poisson process whose intensity per unit time is η. 6 We restrict attention to an equity-financed firm without external financing frictions.
6 Note that the change, dN , for this process is zero until a jump, at which point dN = 1 so that dθ = −θ, and The economy is characterized by a stochastic discount factor, Λ, with a fixed drift, r (the riskless interest rate), and fixed volatility, σ Λ (the maximal Sharpe ratio). That is, Λ obeys the stochastic differential equation:
The constant coefficients imply that the macroeconomic environment is not a source of variation in the firm's business conditions. The model thus does not capture business cycle effects in the cost of capital. The correlation between dW Λ and dW θ , denoted ρ, parameterizes the systematic risk of the firm's earnings stream. We assume ρ < 0, i.e., that the risk premium is positive.
The firm's real options to increase or decrease scale in response to shocks to profitability determine its flexibility. Specifically, the value of the real options is dictated by the cost of these adjustments. The model assumes the firm faces both quasi-fixed and variable costs for either upward or downward adjustments. The cash cost to investors of increasing A by ∆A is denoted P L ∆A, where P L ≥ 1, and the cash extracted from decreasing A by ∆A is P U ∆A, where P U ≤ 1. In addition, the quasi-fixed cost of upward and downward adjustments are written F L θ 1−γ A γ and F U θ 1−γ A γ , respectively, with F L > 0 and F U > 0. These components are proportional to the firm's net revenue at the time of the adjustment, and can be viewed as capturing the forgone revenue due to diversion of scarce internal resources, such as managerial time.
When thinking of A as physical capital, it is natural to view P L as the purchase price, e.g., of machinery, with P L > 1 reflecting installation frictions. That is, there is a deadweight loss of (P L − 1) ∆A of expanding the firm. Likewise P U may be viewed as the resale price, and contraction entails the loss of (1 − P U ) ∆A, due to costly disposal. Thus, the firm's real flexibility decreases if the purchase price, P L , is higher or the resale price, P U , is lower, because either one results in an increased deadweight cost of responding to changes in productivity.
The case P U = 1 implies that assets can be costlessly liquidated. The case P U = 0 is similar to scale-irreversiblity in the sense that nothing is recovered upon contractions. 7 Further, P U < 0 the firm's production terminates. 7 Irreversibility is usually interpreted in the investment literature (e.g., Cooper (2006) ) to imply that the firm's is also conceivable due to penalty costs of terminating long-term contracts, clean-up costs, etc. 8
The firm's objective is to choose an adjustment policy for firm scale, A t , to maximize its market value of equity. HJ show that the re-scaled productivity variable Z t ≡ A t /θ t is a sufficient statistic for the firm's problem, and therefore that the optimal policy may be characterized by four scalar constants: upper and lower adjustment boundaries (denoted U and L) for Z, together with optimal contraction and expansion amounts undertaken upon hitting each of these boundaries. That is, if Z hits U at time t, the optimal adjustment is to an interior point Z = H < U which corresponds to a contraction of ∆A = (U − H)θ t . And when Z hits L, the optimal adjustment is to Z = G > L which corresponds to an expansion of ∆A = (G − L)θ t . 9
Thus, the solution is stationary and scale-invariant in the sense that firm lives forever on the Z interval [L, U ] regardless of the magnitude of A.
Let J(θ, A) denote the market value of the firm's equity. Given the optimal policy, HJ show that, subject to some regularity conditions, the rescaled value of the firm, V (Z) = J(θ, A)/θ, is given by
where B and S are functions of the model parameters given in Appendix A, and D N and D P are two additional scalar parameters. The latter two constants together with the policy boundaries L, G, H and U are characterized by a six-equation system of algebraic equations that is reproduced in Appendix A. Although not solvable analytically in terms of the firm parameters, solutions are readily obtainable numerically. Table 1 summarizes the key notation.
The firm's expected excess return on equity (the risk premium) and the instantaneous volatility of equity returns are then given by
only contraction option is to shut down entirely, i.e., ∆A = A, which our model does not impose. 8 With the broader interpretation of assets-in-place, A, that we have suggested, the frictionless case PL = PU = 1 may not always be the natural benchmark, because expanding the scale of labor inputs, for example, might entail no cash outlay by the firm's owners. Still, in this case, the total value of the firm's operating options would decrease with the difference PL − PU .
9 Notice that the scaling implies that decreases in Z correspond to good news (high productivity) for the firm.
and
where π θ = ρ σ σ Λ is the market price of θ risk. The firm's return on assets ROA(Z) is given by Z γ−1 − m. The elasticity of ROA with respect to productivity shocks -a common definition of operating leverage -is
. 10 The denominator of that expression is not guaranteed to be positive, hence we prefer to define operating leverage as the ratio of quasi-fixed costs to sales, QF C(Z) = m Z 1−γ .
This quantity is time-varying for each firm, and its average level depends on several factors: the firm's optimal choice of adjustment points; the parameters m and γ; and the growth rate of the state variable Z, which is exogenous. 11
10 The elasticity of return on assets with respect to productivity shocks is equal to dROA(A/θ) dθ × θ ROA(A/θ) . 11 By Ito's lemma, the drift of log(Z) is −µ − δ + σ 2 .
Hypothesis Development
To explore empirically the effect of flexibility on firm risk and expected return, the first challenge is to measure flexibility. In the context of the model, it is clear that flexibility means the ability to adjust scale with low adjustment costs. Scale adjustment costs are not directly observable. However, from the model's depiction of optimal firm policies, we can plausibly map firm behavior into a proxy that summarizes flexibility.
With no adjustment costs and a given productivity level θ, the firm will always set A to the value (m/γ) 1/(γ−1) θ to maximize the profit function (1). With adjustment costs, the firm will pursue the discrete adjustment policy described above. Intuitively, as adjustment costs increase, the firm will allow θ to wander farther from this optimal point before incurring the deadweight losses to bring the ratio Z back towards optimality. Thus, inflexibility translates directly into the width of the firm's optimal inaction region. The width of the inaction region will also scale with the potential variability of productivity shocks, which is not directly related to flexibility. An implication of the model, therefore, is that a good summary statistic for scale inflexibility is the distance between the adjustment boundaries, log(U/L), standardized by the volatility of the productivity process, σ. Moreover, the width of that inaction region also describes the observed range of firm profitability and operating leverage, since these are monotonic functions of Z. This observation about inaction regions is the basis for the empirical identification strategy described in the next section.
In order to analyze the cross-sectional asset pricing implications, we can use the model to directly solve for the risk premium function EER(Z), for the return volatility function V OL(Z), as well as for the stationary distribution of Z for firms of differing degrees of flexibility. 12
The key characteristics of the expected excess return function EER(Z), derived in HJ, follow from the superposition of opposing effects due to (a) assets-in-place; and (b) expansion and contraction options. The risk from assets-in-place monotonically increases with Z due to the increasing degree of operating leverage: as Z rises and profitability falls, quasi-fixed production costs magnify the exposure of investor profits to fundamental shocks. By contrast, the risk from both real options declines with Z: in response to good news (falling Z), expansion options become closer to exercise and thus increase investor exposure to productivity shocks; whereas bad news (rising Z) brings contraction options closer to exercise, which lowers investor exposure to these shocks and hence to priced risk.
Thus, in comparing firms, the primary comparative static implication of the model concerns the slope of the risk premium function, EER(Z), rather than its level. And the key driver of this slope is the relative value of the firm's real options. Here we see the direct connection with flexibility: lower scale adjustment costs imply more valuable real options, and thus a greater contribution to the risk premium function from these options than from assets-in-place.
In addition, for flexible firms the range between option exercise points (U and L) is narrow.
One or the other option is usually close to exercise, hence the option-driven component of risk (downward-sloping in Z) dominates. For inflexible firms, since the inaction region is wide, both options are typically far from exercise. So, over most of their range of Z, risk is determined by assets-in-place and hence upward-sloping in Z.
In bringing these observations to the data, another issue arises from the unobservability of the state variable Z. Since the model only encompasses a single dimension of within-firm variability, essentially all measures of current operations are monotonic transformations of Z.
In line with the discussion here, the salient feature of variation in Z is the changing exposure to fundamental risk incurred due to changes in operating leverage. Our empirical approach will thus attempt to measure the time-varying ratio of quasi-fixed costs to sales. [Insert Figure 1 Here] The left panel shows the effect of varying the resale price parameter, P U , while holding all other firm parameters fixed. As the plot illustrates, making the firm's technology more inflexible by lowering the resale price, has two effects. First, as just emphasized, it raises the average slope of the curve: expected excess returns rise steeply with operating leverage (at least over the middle part of the graph) for firms with nearly irreversible assets. Higher P U values result in the average slope changing sign. Second, as P U declines and hence inflexibility increases, the operating range on the horizontal axis increases: the firm chooses to increase U , delaying exercise of its contraction option. Thus, as observed above, the inaction region between the option exercise points (U and L) increases with inflexibility.
The expected return pattern for low P U firms is consistent with existing models in the literature based on irreversible investment (see, e.g., Cooper (2006) ). Less appreciated, however, is the fact that for firms with even a mild degree of reversibility, the average slope of the risk profile is negative: the firm's equity becomes safer as profits decline and operating leverage increases. For such a firm, the contribution of the contraction option actually overwhelms the effect of operating leverage. Intuitively, the contraction option is the right to exchange risky assets for safe cash, and this option will be exercised quickly upon a deterioration in profitability. 13 Notice also that the effects in the left panel can be economically large. Moving from left to right, the risk premium for the inflexible firm increases from about 6% to almost 9%, while that of the flexible firm decreases from 6% to below 3%.
The discussion shows the crucial role of the reversibility parameter, P U , in determining the relative contribution of the contraction option to firm risk. Likewise, the key parameter determining the strength of the expansion option is the installation cost parameter, P L . The right panel in Figure 1 exhibits the effect of varying it. As with the left panel, it is again the case that a less flexible firm (higher P L ) exhibits a steeper (or more positive) average increase in risk premium with operating leverage. Again, too, a less flexible firm inhabits a wider range on the horizontal axis: the firm optimally chooses a lower L.
Comparing the two panels, the variation due to the expansion cost P L is less dramatic than that due to the contraction cost P U . This conclusion is broadly true over a large range of parameter values. Also true numerically is that the fixed component of adjustment costs have much less impact on firm risk profiles (and on the width of the inaction region) than the variable components. For reasonable ranges of variation of F L and F U , the induced effects on flexibility and risk are second order.
There is another interesting observation from the right panel of Figure 1 : the average level of the EER curves decreases as P L increases. Although the variation is not large, in this case, higher inflexibility is not unconditionally associated with higher equity risk. This finding runs somewhat counter to the intuition that firms utilize their real options to buffer investors' exposure to exogenous profitability shocks. Although this is true for the contraction options in the left-hand panel (which represent a put on risky firm assets), growth options (a call on further risky assets) raise investor exposure. Thus making those options more valuable via lowering P L raises the required return on equity, even while conferring increased operating flexibility. Therefore, the model offers no unambiguous prediction as to whether or not there should be an unconditional relation in the data between measures of firm operating flexibility and average stock returns. 14 It is also worth pointing out that the more flexible firm in the right panel operates at a lower average level of profitability and hence at a higher average level of fixed costs than the less flexible firm. This provides another counterexample to intuition, which might suggest that the degree of "cost stickiness" (or average QF C(Z)) measures operating flexibility.
Magnitudes
To gauge the quantitative magnitude of the effect identified above (i.e., the relation between expected return and operating leverage being conditional upon inflexibility), we simulate panels of model firms that differ ex ante in their flexibility, and then differ ex post in the realization of their productivity (and hence operating leverage). Within these panels, we then run tests that closely parallel our subsequent empirical work.
Specifically, the experiment fixes the model parameters to be those estimated by HJ to most closely match an array of operating and financial moments, including mean and interquartile range of profitability and book-to-market, in the population of U.S. listed firms. 15 We then augment their set of baseline parameter values to include heterogeneity in the resale price parameter P U , which has the most significant effect on the shape of the expected return profile.
The simulation uses the values P U = [0.01, 0.13, 0.25, 0.50, 1.00] assigning equal weight to each firm type. (Results incorporating two-dimensional heterogeneity in P U and P L are similar.) For each of the 2,000 firms (indexed by i), realizations of the productivity state θ of the highest and lowest quintile of operating leverage. These results illustrate the model's implication that scale flexibility is a primary determinant of the sensitivity of stock returns to operating leverage.
[Insert Table 2 Here] This implication is also confirmed by cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess stock returns on observable firm characteristics in simulated samples. QF C is the beginning-of-month ratio of quasi-fixed costs to sales, and Range is the standardized range of the state variable Z for each firm. These variables are expressed in percentile rank in each cross-section. The interaction variable, Interaction, is the product of the ranked variables. Table 3 shows the average regression results for 200 simulated panels of 2,000 firms across 50 years.
[Insert Table 3 Here] Columns (1) to (4) in Table 3 show the regression coefficients for four different specifications. As seen in columns (3) and (4), the coefficients on the interaction term are positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude is non-trivial economically, as a coefficient of 0.0100 corresponds to 100 basis points of monthly excess return. Since the interaction variable is a product of percentile ranks, the predicted spread between the expected return of the highest and lowest firm ranked by operating leverage is approximately 100 basis points more positive for the least flexible firms than it is for the most flexible firms.
In this panel, there is no unconditional effect of quasi-fixed operating costs (from Column (1)). While there is a positive unconditional effect of inflexibility on expected returns (from Column (2)), this effect is economically small and switches sign when interacting the two variables. Finally, Column (4) shows that including a standard market risk measure (beta) does not affect the statistical significance of the interaction coefficient. Here beta is the realized market-model regression coefficient computed in rolling 60-month lagged windows (the market return is the equal-weighted average of all the firm returns) within each simulated panel. The estimated betas are imperfect measures of true systematic risk due to the rapidly changing true exposure. This is a common finding in the investment-based asset pricing literature.
To summarize, building on the results of HJ, this section has shown how and why different degrees of flexibility affect firms' risk/reward properties. The general lesson is that operating options contribute a downward-sloping component to expected return (and risk) plotted against operating leverage, while assets-in-place contribute an upward-sloping one. Lower adjustment costs (i.e., higher flexibility) increase the influence of the former, and thus decrease the average slope. Using numerical simulations in plausibly parameterized panels of firms with ex ante differing flexibility, we have shown that this relation can be economically large. In extended simulation results, available upon request, we show that the interaction effect studied here is quantitatively robust to the incorporation of more general heterogeneity in firm parameters.
Data and Measures
This section describes the construction of our proxy variables for firm inflexibility and operating leverage. The measures are grounded in the theory developed above, and are straightforward to construct using standard data sources. 16 We also verify in simulations that they perform reasonably well in small samples at tracking the true unobservable characteristics that we claim they estimate.
Inflexibility Measure
Following the logic described in the previous section, our measure of a firm's inflexibility is a proxy for the width of its inaction region. Intuitively, a firm with less flexible operations (higher adjustment costs) will wait longer before altering its scale to adjust to changes in profitability. 16 Our main sources are the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and the COMPUSTAT Annual and Quarterly Industrial Files (COMPUSTAT). To be included in the sample, a firm must have matching data in both data sets. Following Fama and French (1992) , only NYSE-, AMEX-, and NASDAQ-listed securities with share codes 10 and 11 are included in the sample. Thus, American depositary receipts, real estate investment trusts, and units of beneficial interest are excluded. Furthermore, to limit the impact of small stocks, we exclude stocks with price less than $1 from the sample. Finally, following the standard practice in the empirical asset pricing literature, financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded.
The standardized firm-level range measure, IN F LEX, equals the firm's historical range of operating costs over sales scaled by the volatility of the logarithm of changes in sales over assets. Specifically, the computation for firm i in year t is as follows:
so a higher ratio implies more inflexibility. The range of cost over sales is equivalent to the range of profits over sales, and, under the model, is monotonically related to the width of the inaction region. The model implies that this range will also scale with the volatility, σ, of the firm's productivity shocks. Firms in more volatile businesses will optimally wait longer to exercise their adjustment options. Since this effect is not related to their inherent flexibility, our measure scales by an estimate of fundamental firm risk. The ratio of sales to assets is a basic estimate of productivity. In the model, ∆ log( Sales Assets ) is proportional to ∆ log(Z), whose volatility is σ. In results available upon request, we estimate σ instead using the residuals from the three-stage procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996) to fit each firm's production function. This is substantially more involved econometrically and produces similar results in the tests. For ease of reproducibility, therefore, we use the simpler scaling in the definition of IN F LEX.
Our proxy is new to the literature, and, while easy to compute and grounded in theory, it is also undoubtedly noisy. In practice, many things other than adjustment costs will determine a firm's historical range. Therefore, it is important to ask whether there is any evidence that 17 Results using the full-sample range for each firm are similar and are omitted for brevity.
it is actually picking up variation in firm flexibility. To gauge the validity of our measure, we examine the relation between IN F LEX and a list of variables each of which have been used in the literature to represent aspects of adjustment costs for capital or labor. Each of these can be compared with our measure for some subset of the firm-year observations in our sample. Table   4 reports the correlation coefficients between the inflexibility measure and those variables.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
The top four rows examine measures from the labor literature. First, we consider an
Inf lexible Employment index in the spirit of Syverson (2004), which we compute as the ratio of the cost for nonproduction workers to the cost of all employees. 18 As nonproduction workers are generally regarded as skilled workers and production workers as unskilled or semiskilled workers, Belo et al. (2015) argue that it is easier and less costly for firms to hire or fire production workers compared with nonproduction workers. As such, we anticipate a positive relation between the Inf lexible Employment index and our inflexibility measure. Next, we use Labor F orce U nionization variables constructed from Union Membership and Coverage Database, coverage Cov and membership M em (see, e.g., Hirsch and MacPherson (2002) ).
For example, Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) and Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) also use coverage, which is defined as the percentage of employed workers in a firm's primary Census Industry Classification (CIC) industry covered by unions. Since labor unions decrease firms' operating flexibility, we should expect a positive relation between union coverage rate and our inflexibility measure. The empirical labor literature has also related labor adjustment costs to persistent inter-industry wage differentials (see Hamermesh (1993) and Dube, Freeman, and Reich (2010) ). Higher wage rates (for equivalent jobs) are associated with less flexible employment. The fourth row considers W age P remium across 60 U.S. industries, as estimated by Kim (2016) . As with other labor variables, our interpretation implies that this 18 The cost for nonproduction workers and the cost for all employees are from the U.S. Census Bureau's economic census data from 1958 to 2009 for industries with sic code from 2011 to 3999. Variables in that database include "payment for production workers" and "payment for all employees". statistic should be positively correlated with IN F LEX.
As Table 4 shows, the correlation coefficients of all four labor adjustment cost variables with IN F LEX are indeed positive. Each of the correlations is also highly statistically significant.
Next, we examine asset reallocation and redeployment variables. Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) create an index of capital resalability, Resal Index, which is the share of used capital investment in total capital investment at the four-digit SIC aggregate level. Given that it measures capital flexiblity, it should be negatively related to our range measure of inflexibility, which is confirmed by the table. Furthermore, we examine the capital reallocation measures proposed by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) , which are defined as the sum of acquisitions and sales of property, plant, and equipment (Capital Reallocation) or the sum scaled by assets (Capital Reallocation Rate). Intuitively, firms with higher capital reallocation should be more flexible; hence, we should expect a negative relation between capital reallocation and our inflexibility measure, which is indeed revealed by Table 4 . Lastly, we consider Kim and Kung's (2014) Asset Redeployability measure, which is constructed as the weighted average of 180 asset category's redeployability score (i.e., the ratio of the number of industries that use a given asset to the number of total industries in the BEA table) for each of the 123 BEA industries.
Intuitively, industries with higher asset redeployability should be more flexible; therefore, we predict a negative relation between redeployability and operating inflexibility. Table 4 again confirms these predictions. Each of the capital flexibility measures is negatively correlated with IN F LEX. The magnitudes of the numbers are smaller than for the labor variables, but even the smallest (which can be computed only for a small sample) is still highly statistically significant. Overall, the validation tests provide reassuring support for our assertion that IN F LEX contains important information about firms' scale adjustment flexibility.
In robustness checks, we also construct an industry-level inflexibility measure defined in the same way as IN F LEX, but using industry aggregate operating statistics. That is, we compute industry cost, sales, and assets by summing over all quarterly firm observations in each of the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries, and then construct the historical range of industry aggregate operating costs over sales, scaled by the volatility of the growth rate of sales over assets. To the extent that scale flexibility is an industry-specific characteristic, this measure will be less noisy than its firm-specific counterpart.
A second robustness check utilizes the industry-level inflexibility estimates to construct another firm-level flexibility measure. 19 We first construct an inflexibility factor as the return spread between an inflexible-industry portfolio and a flexible-industry portfolio. Specifically, industries are sorted into three groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) based on the ranked values of the inflexibility measure. Industries with the lowest 30% and highest 30% inflexibility measure form the flexible-industry portfolio and inflexible-industry portfolio, respectively. We then construct firms' loadings on the inflexibility factor as the regression coefficient of firms' monthly returns on the inflexibility factor and use firms' factor loadings as an alternative inflexibility measure.
Operating Leverage Measure
The implication we wish to test concerns the interaction of firm flexibility with operating leverage. As discussed in Section 2, our preferred measure of this is the ratio of quasi-fixed production costs to sales. In the model, these two quantities are mA and θ 1−γ A γ . Hence their ratio, mZ 1−γ , increases monotonically with the firm-specific state variable Z, which is itself not directly observable. However, we can plausibly estimate the numerator and denominator of the operating leverage ratio. We denote the resulting measure QF C.
We employ a standard regression methodology to estimate quasi-fixed costs. Using quarterly COMPUSTAT data for the period 1980-2013, we run five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs on its first lag, contemporaneous sales, and lagged sales. Intuitively, quasi-fixed costs are those that do not scale with contemporaneous sales. The regression specification allows us to compute the predicted costs next period conditional on a next-period sales value 19 We thank the editor for suggesting this idea. of zero. This prediction is the regression intercept plus the contribution of the lagged variables.
The baseline measure of QF C in the year following the 5-year estimation period, then, equals this value, scaled by sales. 20 Specifically, the regression specification is as follows:
where Cost i,q and Cost i,q−1 are the operating costs of firm i in quarter q and q − 1, respectively.
Sales i,q and Sales i,q−1 are sales value of firm i in quarter q and q − 1, respectively. Then, QF C for firm i in year t is:
Here Costmean i,t−1 and Salesmean i,t−1 are average costs and average sales over four quarters in year t − 1. To get a sense of these estimates, a typical value for a given firm-year might be 0.17, meaning that, as of the end of the prior year, we would expect the firm to have unavoidable costs equal to seventeen percent of this year's sales.
We also construct an alternative measure of QF C as the regression intercept scaled by sales over assets from five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs over assets on sales over assets. The regression specification is as follows:
The alternative measure of QF C for firm i in year t is a i , scaled by the average sales-over-assets ratio over four quarters in year t − 1. As further robustness check, we reduce the noisiness of QF C estimates by increasing the minimum number of observations from 10 to 15 for every
five-year window.
20 To minimize the impact of outliers and data errors, we require that the rolling windows for each regression contain at least 10 observations and quarterly growth rates of assets, costs, and sales are no more than plus or minus 75 percent. The data filters lower the number of firm-months in which QF C estimates can be produced by about 3 percent. Our test results below are robust to alternative filtering procedures.
Performance of Empirical Measures in Simulated Sample
While we have grounded our estimation strategy firmly in theory, one may still ask how well our estimators should be expected to perform, even within the model. Does the model imply that, in finite samples, they will do a good job at capturing the theoretical quantities they are supposed to represent?
We address this by a simulation experiment in which we use the simulated values of firms' accounting numbers (sales, assets, and costs) to reproduce exactly the empirical procedures described above. Specifically, we simulate 200 panels of 2,000 firms for 50 years, and then construct our empirical measures in each cross-section. 21 We can then compare these to the true population quantities. Table 5 shows the results.
[Insert Table 5 (8) and (9). These are compared to the true value mZ (1−γ) , which differs across firms due to heterogeneity in the realizations of the firm-specific stochastic process Z = Z i,t . In the empirical work, we run our estimation annually, and then fix the estimates through out the following year. (The tests use monthly stock returns.) To see whether the performance of the estimator declines significantly as it becomes more out-of-date, the table reports correlations as a function of the quarter after estimation, q, when the true statistic is recorded. That is, q represents the estimation lag. The results show that QF C works well with a one-quarter lag (with a correlation over 60 percent) and that this performance suffers very little decline even a year after estimation.
In sum, we have introduced here the two empirical proxies that form the basis of our empirical work. They are straightforward to construct and have natural interpretations in the context of the model. We have provided supporting evidence, via simulation and via comparison with other proxies suggested by the literature, that they capture the intended information. We now examine the model's implications regarding their relation with stock returns.
Empirical Results
Using these measures of scale inflexibility and operating leverage, we now test the model's primary implication that the relation of stock returns to operating leverage depends on adjustment frictions. Our hypothesis is that the strength of the relation increases with inflexibility, that is, operating leverage increases expected returns more for more inflexible firms.
Portfolio Sorts
To gauge the economic magnitude of the interaction effect, we study portfolios formed by sorts on the two variables. Specifically, for each month, we assign stocks into quintile portfolios based on firms' inflexibility measure. We then intersect these quintiles with a second independent sort of firms into quintiles according to their estimated quasi-fixed costs over sales. After assignment to portfolios, stocks are held for one month. Table 6 reports summary statistics of the 25 independently sorted portfolios for six portfolio characteristics: the inflexibility measure, quasi-fixed costs over sales, return on assets, capital expenditure, market value of debt, and market equity.
[Insert Table 6 Here] Panels A and B of Table 6 show the sorting variables IN F LEX and QF C, respectively.
Next, Panel C contains return on assets, which becomes much worse as quasi-fixed costs increase. This finding makes intuitive sense, as quasi-fixed costs are inversely related to profitability. Panel E suggests that inflexible firms are associated with lower debt levels than flexible firms, perhaps because financial and real flexibility are substitutes (see also D'Acunto et al.
(2016)). That is, negative productivity shocks could lead inflexible firms to financial distress or even bankruptcy if such firms have not retained high financial flexibility (by taking on less debt).
Lastly, market equity in Panel F exhibits a strong pattern: firm size decreases as quasi-fixed costs increase, irrespective of the industry's inflexibility.
Next, we calculate the portfolio return as the equal-weighted average of the returns of the stocks in each of the 25 portfolios. Table 7 presents [Insert Table 7 Here]
The results in Table 7 reveal a significant interaction effect between inflexibility and operating leverage. Specifically, the excess return spread between the lowest and highest QF C quintiles is monotonically increasing from the most flexible firms to the most inflexible firms.
In Panel A, the return spread is about 12 basis points per month and insignificant (t-statistic = 0.25) for the most flexible firms, it increases to 64 basis points (t-statistic = 3.48) per month for less flexible firms, and for the most inflexible firms, it is about 88 basis points per month with a significance at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.53). This finding is consistent with the implication of Figure 1 that if inflexibility is high (low), then the expected stock returns increase (decrease or are flat) with operating leverage. Notice that the pattern in Table 7 is strikingly similar to the one for model simulated data shown in Table 2 .
The results in Panel B are supportive. It remains the case that the return spread between the highest and lowest QF C quintiles is almost monotonically increasing as firms become more inflexible. Specifically, the return spreads for the two most flexible quintiles are 17 basis points and negative 6 basis points per month, respectively, and they are statistically insignificant (tstatistic = 0.30 or 0.33), whereas for the most inflexible quintile, the return spread is 67 basis points with a significance at the 1% level (t-statistic = 2.87).
To ensure the results are not driven by small firms, Panel C shows that the portfolio return pattern is similar or even stronger when firms in the lowest quintile by size are excluded. We also verify below that the pattern prevails when we control for firm size in regression tests. (2015) 
Panel D shows that Fama and French

Return Regressions
To control for other determinants of expected returns, we examine our hypothesis in regression specifications. In this context, the hypothesis suggests that the slope coefficient of an interaction term between inflexibility and operating leverage should be positive and significant.
[Insert Table 8 Here] Table 8 reports the results for Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. The baseline interaction test, column (4), confirms the results from the two-way sorts in the previous subsection. In specifications (5) to (8), we include standard control variables, namely, reversal (R01), momentum (R12), book-to-market ratio (BM ), market leverage (M L), and size (SZ). The variable R01 is the stock return over the previous month; R12 is the stock return over the 11 months preceding the previous month; BM denotes the log of the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity; M L is the log of the market leverage ratio defined as the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of long-term debt; and SZ is the log of the market value of equity. All variables are transformed into percentile ranks to diminish the possible influence of outliers.
When these controls are included, the coefficient on the interaction term, IN T ER, is positive and statistically significant and almost identical to column (4). For example, for specification (5) with the baseline definition of QF C, the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.0106 with a t-statistic of 2.78. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient is economically large, as a coefficient of 0.0106 corresponds to 106 basis points of monthly excess returns. Since the interaction term is the product of percentile ranks that range from 0 to 1, a coefficient of 0.0106 means that the return spread between the lowest and highest QF C firms is 106 basis points higher for the most inflexible firms than it is for the most flexible firms.
Moreover, in comparing specification (1) with specification (5), we observe that the coefficient estimates on BM are undiminished by the presence of our variables. Neither the unconditional inflexibility effect nor the conditional (interaction) effect with quasi-fixed costs over sales significantly lowers the explanatory power of the book-to-market ratio, suggesting that the value effect is more likely driven by cross-firm differences in risk (i.e., ρ σ in the model) than by within-firm variation caused by quasi-fixed costs.
Specifications (6)-(8) report results for alternative measures of quasi-fixed costs over sales. Specification (6) uses the intercept scaled by sales over assets from the rolling-window regression of operating costs over assets on sales over assets as QF C. Specification (7) uses the intercept plus the predicted costs from the rolling-window estimation divided by sales as QF C, and the minimum number of observations for every five-year window increases from 10 to 15. Specification (8) uses the intercept scaled by sales over assets from the rolling-window regression of operating costs over assets on sales over assets as QF C, and the minimum number of observations for every five-year window increases from 10 to 15 as well. Notably, all coefficient estimates for the interaction term are reliably positive and statistically significant at the 5% level at least.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
To verify our results are robust to a more general error structure, Table 9 contains the results from unbalanced panel regressions with standard errors clustered by firm and time (see Petersen (2009) ). The results are economically and statistically unchanged, in particular, on the interaction term.
Industry-level Inflexibility Measure and Factor Loadings
Although the model's implications are at firm level, it is reasonable to conjecture that a firm's ability to adjust its scale relates to industry-wide features of physical and technological capital.
To the extent that scale flexibility may be industry-specific, it is informative to construct an industry-level measure analogous to our firm-level measure (as described in Section 3.1). Portfolio excess returns and abnormal returns (i.e., five-factor alphas) for this industry measure of inflexibility are presented in Panels A and B in Table 10 , respectively.
[Insert Table 10 Here] As shown in Panel A, the return spread between the highest and lowest QF C quintiles monotonically increases from 44 basis points per month in flexible industries to 64 basis points in less flexible industries, and to 74 basis points per month in inflexible industries. Comparing to the portfolio excess returns when firm-level inflexibility measure is used, the pattern is very similar, although the effect is a bit weaker. Panel B shows these excess returns can not be explained by Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Thus, the model's implications are also confirmed using this industry-level inflexibility measure.
The next test combines information in the industry measures with firm-level equity return information. Specifically, we construct an inflexibility factor as the return spread between inflexible-industry and flexible-industry portfolios, which are formed based on sorts on industry inflexibility. Firms' loading on this factor can be computed as the regression coefficient of firms' monthly stock returns on the inflexibility factor. Portfolio test results using these factor loadings as a proxy for firm-level inflexibility are presented in Panels C and D in Table 10 . The fairly monotonic pattern of the return spread across inflexibility quintiles again confirms our main findings. Specifically, the return spread is 45, 48, and 110 basis points per month for the most flexible firms, less flexible firms, and the most inflexible firms, respectively.
Taken together, the results in this section support the hypothesis that there is a positive interaction effect between scale inflexibility and operating leverage in determining expected stock returns. In the context of the model, flexible firms' contraction options become more valuable as operating leverage rises, lowering exposure to fundamental (priced) risk and reducing expected stock returns, whereas inflexible firms with fewer (or more costly) contraction options can not reduce scale easily when operating leverage rises. Thus, firms with higher operating leverage are riskier when they are more inflexible.
Second Moment Evidence
Recall that, according to the model, the instantaneous volatility of the stock return, V OL(Z), can be expressed as −EER(Z)/(ρ σ). If we assume ρ < 0, then equity return volatility should exhibit the same conditional patterns as expected returns do. In the preceding section, we tested the model's predictions about the real option effect on equity returns. Now, we provide further evidence by examining the real option effect on the second moments of expected returns.
Returning to the portfolios formed by two-way independent sorts on scale inflexibility and operating leverage, we compute average return volatility for each portfolio. Specifically, we calculate the volatility of each stock in the portfolio as the standard deviation of CRSP daily return over a one year time period and then use the average value of those volatilities as the portfolio return volatility. 22 The results are presented in Panels A and C in Table 11 .
[Insert Table 11 Here]
As Panel A shows, the volatility pattern closely resembles the return pattern in Table 7 .
More precisely, the portfolio return volatility increases monotonically as quasi-fixed costs over sales rises. This positive relation becomes more pronounced as firms become more inflexible.
That is, the annualized high-minus-low volatility is 11.82% for the most flexible firms with a t-statistic of 4.29, this value increases to 15.74% with a t-statistic of 9.44 for less flexible firms, and it further increases to 18.77% with a t-statistic of 11.49 for the most inflexible firms.
Panel C excludes 20% smallest size firms from the sample and shows similar volatility patterns. Specifically, the annualized high-minus-low portfolio return volatility monotonically increases from 9.56% for flexible firms to 16.69% for inflexible firms; meanwhile, the t-statistic rises from 4.20 to 11.24. Thus, our test results are not driven by small size firms. Moreover, the model implies that systematic risk should follow the same pattern as the expected returns. To assess this prediction, we compute the average stock beta for each of the double sorted portfolios. We obtain the stock beta by running a rolling-window regression of monthly stock returns on the value-weighted market return over the previous 36 months. Table 11 report average portfolio betas for the full sample and the sample without the 20% smallest size firms, respectively.
Panels B and D in
As predicted, average portfolio betas follows the same pattern as average stock returns in Table 7 . In other words, a firm's systematic risk as measured by the market beta increases as operating leverage and scale inflexibility increases. Moreover, the beta spread across QF C portfolios is almost monotonically increasing as inflexibility rises. For example, in Panel B, the beta spreads for flexible, less flexible, and inflexible firms are 0.0066, 0.1502, 0.2337, respectively, with t-statistics of 0.09, 2.36, and 3.90, respectively. Panel D provides supportive evidence as well. The corresponding beta spread for flexible, less flexible, and inflexible firms are 0.0033, 0.1524, 0.2851, respectively, with t-statistics of 0.05, 2.50 and 4.63, respectively.
To summarize, the results from portfolio sorts on portfolio return volatility and market beta largely support the model's predictions with respect to the second moments of equity returns: return volatility and systematic risk display interaction effects similar to the ones found for stock returns. We therefore conclude that the presence and, in particular, cross-firm variation of real option effects is important for us to gain a better understanding of expected returns and risk.
Conclusion
Investment-based asset pricing has highlighted the role of irreversibility as a determinant of firms' equity risk and expected return. We augment this class of models by examining the additional cross-sectional implications of heterogeneity in operating flexibility (or real options) in a dynamic model of a firm with assets-in-place, contraction options, and expansion options.
The model is both rich enough to encompass ex ante heterogeneous firms, and yet simple enough to reveal general implications of this heterogeneity for a firm's equity return and risk.
Empirically, we construct and validate a firm-level range measure for inflexibility that is directly implied by the theory. It enables us to confirm the important role that inflexibility plays in determining the validity of the operating leverage hypothesis. Specifically, we find the relation between operating leverage and stock returns is weak for flexible firms and this relation becomes much stronger as inflexibility rises. Moreover, we find inflexibility is associated with higher expected returns when operating leverage is high. That is, we document an interaction effect between inflexibility and operating leverage on stock returns. We also find consistent evidence for second moments of stock returns (i.e., betas and volatilities).
Overall, our findings cast doubt on an unconditional effect of flexibility on expected returns.
We emphasize that real option values can shape significantly a firm's exposure to priced risk when operating conditions deteriorate or improve. That is, scale inflexibility not only affects a firm's optimal investment policy in good states, but also alters a firm's disinvestment policy in bad states. As firms make other operating decisions, such as, debt policies, acquisition activities, hiring and firing of labor, innovation or research and development, our easily reproducible range measure can be used to study how scale inflexibility affects these operating decisions, which would be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Appendix A. Model Solution
This appendix provides the system of equations that is needed to solve the model described in Section 2. The firm's objective is to increase or decrease its scale, A, to maximize the market value of its equity:
(A.1)
In terms of the rescaled state variable Z and the rescaled value function V , the task is to choose points G, L, U , H on the positive Z axis to maximize V . Absence of arbitrage imposes the two value matching conditions (VMCs):
3)
The first equation requires that the post-investment value of the firm is the pre-investment value plus the funds injected. The second imposes the same for pre-and post-disinvestment (note H −U < 0). Given these, functionally differentiating with respect to the barrier positions, yield the smooth-pasting conditions (SPCs) as necessary conditions of optimality. These are:
As described in the text, HJ show that, subject to some regularity conditions, the solution function V satisfies an ordinary differential equation, the form of whose solution is given by equation (4). The constants that appear in the equation are:
When (4) is plugged into each of the SPCs and VMCs, the result is a system of six equations in D N , D P , G, L, U , and H. The system is linear in the first two, given the last four unknowns.
But the nonlinearity in the last four renders numerical solution necessary. Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of realized monthly excess stock returns on firm characteristics in 200 simulated panels of 2000 firms for 50 years. The population consists of firms having the baseline parameter values of Hackbarth and Johnson (2015) with the disposal value of firm assets taking on the values PU = [0.01, 0.06, 0.13, 0.25, 0.50, 1.00]. QF C is the beginning-of-month ratio of quasi-fixed costs to sales; Range is the standardized range of scaled productivity, Z, for each firm. These variables are expressed as percentile rank in each cross-section. The interaction variable, Interaction is the product of the ranks. Beta is the market-model regression coefficient computed in rolling 60-month lagged windows. The coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses are the cross-panel means of the Fama-MacBeth estimators. The numbers in brackets are the cross-panel standard deviations of the point estimates. The significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Kim (2016) as an estimated fix wage premium paid by each of the 60 U.S. industries (Census Industry Classification(CIC) industry). Resal Index is the capital resalability index defined in Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) . Capital Reallocation and Capital Reallocation Rate are the capital reallocation measures defined in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) as the sum of acquisitions and sales of property, plant, and equipment or the sum scaled by assets. Redeoloyability Index is the redeployability index defined in Kim and Kung (2016) . All variables are transformed into percentile ranks to limit the impact of outliers. The sample period ranges from January 1980 to December 2013. The significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Redeployability Index -0.1102*** ≺ 0.0001 10045 Table 5 Performance of Empirical Proxies in Simulated Panels. This table shows correlations between our empirical measures and their population counterparts in simulated samples of 2000 firms as described in the caption to Table 2 . Observations of each firm's assets, sales, and costs are tabulated at quarterly frequency within each simulated path, and the empirical estimators are constructed from these. The numbers reported are cross-firm correlations of the rank of each statistic with the true firm characteristic. The cross-panel standard deviations are given in parentheses. Panel A considers the estimator of firm inflexibility as summarized by the standardized range log(U/L)/σ. IN F LEX estimates this by the realized range of each firm's costs-to-sales ratio divided by the realized standard deviation of the log changes in the salesto-asset ratio. The performance of the estimator is shown as a function of the length of the observation history, T , in years. Panel B considers the estimator of operating leverage as summarized by the ratio of quasi-fixed costs to sales, whose true value is mZ (1−γ) . The estimator QF C is constructed from a regression estimate of fixed costs in a five-year window of quarterly observations and divided by sales observed at the end of that window (see equations (8) and (9)). The performance of the estimator is shown as a function of the quarter after estimation, q, when the true statistic is computed. Table 6 Summary Statistics.
Variables
This table reports summary statistics of the 25 portfolios sorted on the inflexibility measure and quasi-fixed costs over sales. The measure of inflexibility is constructed as firm's historical range of operating costs over sales scaled by the volatility of the difference between the logarithm of sales over assets and its lagged value. Firm-level estimates of QF C are obtained by running five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs on its first lag, contemporaneous sales, and lagged sales. The measure of QF C in the year following the 5-year estimation period equals the sum of regression intercept and predicted operating costs, scaled by sales. Panels A, B IN F LEX) , quasi-fixed costs over sales (QF C), and their product (IN T ER), as well as on controls for expected returns. The measure of inflexibility is constructed as firm's historical range of operating costs over sales scaled by the volatility of the difference between the logarithm of sales over assets and its lagged value. Firm-level estimates of QF C are obtained by running five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs on its first lag, contemporaneous sales, and lagged sales. The measure of QF C in the year following the 5-year estimation period equals the sum of regression intercept and predicted operating costs, scaled by sales. An alternative definition of QF C is constructed as the intercept from a 5-year, rolling-window regression of operating costs over assets on sales over assets, scaled by sales over assets. The variable R01 is the stock return over the previous month; R12 is the stock return over the 11 months preceding the previous month; BM denotes the log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity; M L is the log of the market leverage ratio defined as book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt; and SZ is the log of the market value of equity. All variables are transformed into percentile rank form. Specification (5) uses baseline definition of QF C; specification (6) uses the alternative definition of QF C; specification (7) uses the baseline definition of QF C from the 5-year rolling-window regression with 15 observations for every 5-year window; specification (8) ER) , as well as on controls for expected returns. The measure of inflexibility is constructed as firm's historical range of operating costs over sales scaled by the volatility of the difference between the logarithm of sales over assets and its lagged value. Firm-level estimates of QF C are obtained by running five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs on its first lag, contemporaneous sales, and lagged sales. The measure of QF C in the year following the 5-year estimation period equals the sum of regression intercept and predicted operating costs, scaled by sales. An alternative definition of QF C is constructed as the intercept from a 5-year, rolling-window regression of operating costs over assets on sales over assets, scaled by sales over assets. The variable R01 is the stock return over the previous month; R12 is the stock return over the 11 months preceding the previous month; BM denotes the log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity; M L is the log of the market leverage ratio defined as book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of market value of equity and book value of long-term debt; and SZ is the log of the market value of equity. All variables are transformed into percentile rank form to limit the impact of outliers. Specification (5) uses baseline definition of QF C; specification (6) uses the alternative definition of QF C; specification (7) uses the baseline definition of QF C from the 5-year rolling-window regression with 15 observations for every 5-year window; specification (8) uses the alternative definition of QF C with 15 observations for every 5-year window. The sample period ranges from January 1980 to December 2013. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time (year and month). t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the estimation coefficient. The significance level 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
SZ
-0.0240*** -0.0220*** -0.0225*** -0.0205*** -0.0209*** (6.71) (6.69) (6.81) (6.36) (6.47) R 2 0.8% 0.3% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% Table 10 Portfolio Excess Returns using Industry-level Measure and Firm-level Factor Loading. This table shows the monthly excess returns (in %) of 25 portfolios formed by double sorting on firm-level quasi-fixed costs over sales (QF C) and two measures of inflexibility (IN F LEX) . The industry-level measure of inflexibility is constructed as the historical range of aggregate operating costs over sales scaled by the volatility of the difference between the logarithm of aggregate sales over assets and its lagged value. Firm-level factor loadings are firms' return loadings on the inflexibility factor, which is constructed as the return spread between inflexible-industry portfolios and flexible-industry portfolios. In particular, industries are sorted into three groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) based on the ranked values of the inflexibility measure. Industries with the lowest 30% and highest 30% inflexibility measure form the flexible-industry portfolio and inflexible-industry portfolio, respectively. Firm-level estimates of QF C are obtained by running five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs on its first lag, contemporaneous sales, and lagged sales. The measure of QF C in the year following the 5-year estimation period equals the sum of regression intercept and predicted operating costs, scaled by sales. Panels A and B report excess returns and Fama and French (2015) five-factor alpha when industrylevel inflexibility measure is used. Panels C and D report excess returns and Fama and French (2015) five-factor alpha when firm-level facor loadings are used to proxy for firm's inflexbility level. The sample period ranges from January 1980 to December 2013. The significance level 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Table 11 Annualized Return Volatility and Average Beta for 25 Portfolios. This table reports annualized return volatility and average beta for each of the 25 double-sorted portfolios in Table 7 . The measure of inflexibility is constructed as firm's historical range of operating costs over sales scaled by the volatility of the difference between the logarithm of sales over assets and its lagged value. Firm-level estimates of QF C are obtained by running five-year, rolling-window regressions of operating costs on its first lag, contemporaneous sales, and lagged sales. The measure of QF C in the year following the 5-year estimation period equals the sum of regression intercept and predicted operating costs, scaled by sales. Stock return volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of CRSP daily return data over one year time period, then the average annualized volatility is reported. Stock beta is constructed as the regression coefficient on the market return from a regression of monthly stock returns on the monthly value-weighted market return over the past 36 months, then the average beta of each portfolio is reported. Panels C and D report annualized return volatility and average beta when firms in the lowest quintile by size are excluded from the sample. The sample period ranges from January 1980 to December 2013. The significance level 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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